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This paper examines the conflict between anonymity and security in the context of new innovations that leverage the
Internet. Anonymity affords an opportunity for the marginalized to express opinions without fear of persecution or
discrimination; however, anonymity also facilitates crime and fraud. Its antithesis, traceability, is meant to deter
malicious behavior, but can also be used by governments to control and persecute their populations. The debate
between anonymity and security on the Internet is intricately intertwined with threats to domestic and international
security. As we launch into the implementation of the Smart Grid, arguably the largest engineering project of modern
times, it is time to reexamine the fundamental premises on which the Internet was constructed. A single Internet may
no longer be able to handle the conflicting demands of different applications. A new Internet with rules that balance
security and anonymity may be appropriate for Smart Grid and other similar critical infrastructure projects. I present
the rationale of rethinking the design of the Internet that simplifies its architecture, reduces its complexity, and
removes vulnerabilities that have been exploited persistently. I also discuss some of the current trends, especially
those related to standards and guidelines on Smart Grid privacy and security.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Many people do not realize how inextricably their lives depend on electricity until there is a blackout. Today’s fragile
electric grid runs to capacity in several places with obsolete equipment. One of the largest engineering challenges
today is modernizing the electric grid to make it more resilient and efficient. This effort will result in an intelligent
electric grid with the ability to recover from faults autonomously through use of sensors and automated relays. This
redesigned grid is being termed the smart grid. The smart grid leverages information and communication technology
extensively for achieving resilience and efficiency. Operationally, the smart grid superimposes the communication
grid on top of the power grid to enable extensive data collection and analysis. In the near future, it will connect
millions of electric meters, relays, power stations, and generators into a single network that controls power
transmission, distribution, and usage. This extensive data collection will provide operators with the ability to monitor
the grid, to accurately pinpoint (and even self-correct) any faults, and to fine tune the grid for improved operational
efficiency. This massive effort has three primary initiatives: that is, 1) adding sensors throughout the network, 2)
allowing two-way metering, and 3) adding demand-response capability. Sensors in the network allow for monitoring
and building resilience in the grid. Two-way metering allows micro energy generation sources at individual
household level to be integrated into the grid. Demand-response allows utility companies to manage load variability
by actively controlling electricity usage at an appliance level in households. In the past, the variability was managed
by increasing and decreasing electricity supply through fast starting generators, which is very expensive. All of these
functions are intricately dependent on information and communication technologies (ICT). This intricate dependence
on ICT also makes it a potent target for attacks from multiple actors including criminals, terrorists, and nation states.
Obviously, the power grid is an essential element of a country’s critical infrastructure and needs to be both secure
and reliable. The smart grid would be the largest network of physical nodes in size after the Internet, and could even
grow to surpass it. In designing the smart grid, two questions emerge: (1) does the smart grid need to be part of the
existing monolithic Internet?, and (2) should the same ideals (e.g., anonymity, privacy, and uniformity) that apply to
the Internet guide the smart grid’s construction?
While the Internet is being used as a blueprint for designing the smart grid, its implementation should consider the
lessons learned in the past to avoid any unnecessary pitfalls. History has shown that humans tend to repeat the
same mistakes time and again, and such errors with the smart grid would have grave consequences, especially
since cyber warfare is becoming the next arena for international conflict. The smart grid would be a prime target for
cyber-attacks during conflict since power failures can have serious economic and psychological consequences on
the attacked country. An intuitive first step would be to examine the basic assumptions on which the Internet was
initially created and ask ourselves if these same assumptions are relevant considering the Internet evolved into a
complex entity in an attempt to balance conflicting requirements. We need to think of unconventional, novel ideas
that will radically change the existing paradigm. Were the assumptions inadequate, we would need to rewrite them
to fit better with today’s realities. The fact that the Internet is, essentially, a single monolithic network that caters to
multiple applications with conflicting needs is a severe limiting factor. One possible solution would be to create
different internets for specific purposes. What would be the ramifications of creating a parallel Internet with a
different set of assumptions more suited for the smart grid?
In this paper, I examine the basic tenets on which the current Internet was developed and examine its implication on
for the smart grid. The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, I describe the smart grid and discuss in-depth its
data storage, security, and anonymity requirements. In Section 3, I discuss the anonymity dilemma in relation to
personal freedom and security on the Internet at a holistic level. In Section 4, I discuss the changing needs of the
Internet and provide thoughts on addressing the security vs. anonymity dilemma. In Section 5, I conclude the paper.

II. SMART GRID
Multiple failures or significant oscillations in voltage and phase can cause failures that cascade into large-scale
blackouts, as evidenced in the Northeast Blackout in 2012. The fact that the power grid is overstressed in places is
evident from
the widespread
blackouts
that occurred in North America
Europe
in 2010 and
in India in 2012.
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current method of balancing supply and demand in the grid (to avoid voltage drops and power surges) is inefficient
kirjoitettavaan
tekstiin.
and requires
constant interaction
between generators and grid operators. The design of the grid is very utility centric,
which makes it difficult to incorporate alternate energy sources such as wind and solar into it (Goel, Bush, & Bakken,
2013). Efforts to integrate alternative energy sources (e.g., solar, wind, and wave power) into the grid complicate our
ability to achieve a stable balance due to the variability and unpredictability of these sources. Finally, grid
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synchronization (i.e., efforts to ensure that the phases of the current are aligned to prevent power loss) needs to be
vastly improved in order to prevent interruptions in supply. With smart grid, the goal is to improve the grid’s stability
and reliability and, at the same time, enable new functionality to facilitate the incorporation of distributed renewable
sources.
This smart grid is envisioned as an interconnected power distribution network that streamlines the transmission,
distribution, monitoring, and control of electricity. In order to achieve this interconnectivity, the smart grid
fundamentally alters the grid’s architecture by blurring the boundaries between generation, transmission, and
distribution to create a single monolithic grid. At the most basic level, one can view the electric grid as a large
complex network composed of interconnected power plants, electricity distribution infrastructure, and consumers
interspersed across national and international borders. Technologically, one can view the smart grid as a
superposition of the Internet on the electric grid (Goel et al., 2013). Grid efficiency stems from the ability of the
information network to allow efficient operation of the grid by reducing the latency of information in it. While the
current grid allows only a one-way communication and flow of power, the smart grid will allow for two-way
communication and two-way flow of power. Generally, consumers only draw power from the electric grid. In the
future, greater numbers of consumers will supply power back to the grid through solar panels, windmills, or even
stationary bikes that can be used for both exercise and power generation. With smart grid, the goal is thus to
address three key issues: (1) the grid’s fragility, (2) load-balance on the grid, and (3) difficulty in integrating
renewable micro-energy sources in the grid. Smart grid implementation has several other objectives, which include
increasing competition between providers, improving transmission reliability, and enabling market forces to drive
consumption. The smart grid’s success rests in its ability to provide ubiquitous, secure communication throughout
the grid. This will allow data to be collected, analyzed, and interpreted for decision making in order to achieve the
goals set for it. An information network will be overlaid on the conventional power grid; this integrated network will
collect data, manage the grid, and keep track of power failures and, thus, revolutionize the way the grid functions. In
building the smart grid, we need to answer the following questions: What data will the communication network carry?
What security requirements need to be imposed on this network? What is the importance of anonymity and privacy
on this network?

Smart Grid Data
The smart grid will carry two kinds of data: 1) two-way electricity metering data, and 2) diagnostic and state data
from sensors placed on the grid. Metering data are collected from individual consumers for demand prediction,
billing, and demand response. Diagnostic data on the network comes from sensors in the grid that are used to detect
faults on it so that they can be isolated with reclosers, and state data will come from special sensors called
synchrophasors, which measure the characteristics of electric waves on the grid using a common time source for
synchronization. The volume of data being collected will increase dramatically with the smart grid. For instance,
utilities currently collect one monthly reading per customer. If they start collecting information each minute with the
smart grid, the monthly reading per customer will grow to over 43,000 readings. The data collected from sensors will
increase even more drastically as we attempt to gain visibility into the grid and will make transmitting, storing, and
analyzing data a huge challenge.

Security and Anonymity in the Smart Grid
Data integrity is extremely important since data manipulation could not only lead to customer inconvenience but also
to instability and disruptions in the grid. The smart grid is quite vulnerable to data spoofing attacks, which includes
transmitting false sensor data, disabling relays, disrupting load balance, and inducing faults. Diagnostic data
corruption could drastically hurt disaster recovery if utility crews are misdirected to phantom faults. State data allows
corrections to operational variables in the grid to ensure it is maintained in a narrow range of state parameters for
maximum efficiency. If this data were manipulated, the grid controllers could react to false readings and make
corrective actions that can destabilize the grid. There are clear needs for integrity since data tampering could result
in metering fraud, large-scale metering fraud, and the undermining of operators’ efforts to balance the grid. Any such
weakness can be exploited by terrorists and cyber nation states alike, who can deploy hacking tools, including
malware, to cripple the network. Availability is also important since data are required in real-time for operational
needs, and failure to obtain information can lead to degradation of performance and, in a worst case scenario, data
from critical sensors or SCADA systems during crisis conditions can lead to cascading failures.

Importance of Anonymity in the Smart Grid
With the smart grid, the metering data collected will become much more precise; user behavior could be easily
inferred from electricity usage patterns. Anonymity is primarily associated with this metering data, which is timeseries data, required for accurately predicting demand in the short term and for computing consumer electricity
usage for billing based on time of use. In the past, electric meters only aggregated usage and charged the same
price irrespective of time of power use even though prices vary significantly from region to region. Each appliance
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has a unique electricity usage signature; by analyzing the overall usage signature, the usage of different appliances
can be easily determined (i.e., what appliances people are using and at what time of the day). This information can
reveal individual’s lifestyle, which can be used for target marketing, discrimination (e.g. in insurance and
employment), evidentiary purposes in lawsuits, and even committing crimes, such as, robbery, kidnapping, and
stalking. Data needs to be secured; however, metering data needs to be associated with specific consumers for
billing, obviating the need for anonymity. This raises the question of how much data can be collected before
individual freedom and security are threatened. There are precedents from Internet that we can draw on to
understand the problem better.
The issues related to managing large volumes of data and their integrity and availability are primarily technical
issues that can be largely addressed by technical means that include increasing storage and computing capacity,
integrity checks, redundant communication media, fallback decision rules in duress conditions, and so on. There are
issues of privacy and anonymity that are fundamentally different and that impact the user and need a deeper
analysis that goes to the core of constitutional rights and to the fundamentals of the Internet’s design (Leiner et al.,
1997). I discuss this in depth in Section 3.

III. ANONYMITY AND PRIVACY ON THE INTERNET
The Internet has greatly encouraged access to information and freedom of expression worldwide. The Internet both
reflects and influences societal norms and can be a great equalizer. Several well-known Internet activists have
strongly argued for freedom on the Internet and net neutrality (Wu, 2003; Lessig & McChesney, 2006; Berners-Lee,
2010). This freedom is also considered an anathema to political stability because it allows actors inimical to
governments to express their views, foment unrest, recruit followers, and communicate anonymously (Tufekci,
2011). The balance between security and freedom constantly shifts in response to perceived threats. In times of war,
individuals often give up personal freedoms for the sake of national security. The United States, in wake of the
September 11, 2001 attacks on New York and Washington DC, enacted new legislation that greatly restricted
personal freedoms and expanded government powers of surveillance in the name of national security1. Countries all
over the world began to control Internet content in the aftermath of the revolutions in the Middle-East that led to the
ousting of several regimes; these revolutions seem to be catalyzed by protests coordinated over social media
(Axford, 2011; Eltantawy & Wiest, 2011; Comunello & Anzera, 2012). The balance between security and freedom is
not necessarily an inverse relationship (where maximizing one will minimize the other) but rather a multimodal space
where security can be increased without necessarily having a negative impact on freedom (Verzi & Coates, 2004).
There has been sustained debate over anonymity on the Internet since its inception. Anonymity is important’
however, it is also a limiting constraint in ensuring security. Anonymity and privacy are often used interchangeably,
but are not synonymous. Something done anonymously remains unattributed to a known actor even if the act itself is
made public. Something done privately is intended to be known only by a limited group of trusted parties. Free
speech on the Internet is facilitated by anonymity2, which allows individuals to express their views openly without
fear of persecution or discrimination. Internet privacy (Cranor, 1999), on the other hand, restricts access to
information to a specific individual or a group of predetermined individuals; it is facilitated by the use of encryption
techniques and related technologies (Bonneau & Preibusch, 2010). I discuss the issue of anonymity in the following
two subsections, and subsequently discuss privacy and the balance between privacy and anonymity.

Need for Anonymity
Several potent arguments for anonymity on the Internet exist; these, in essence, boil down to protecting individuals
from persecution, discrimination, and embarrassment. Anonymity allows religious, ethnic, and political minorities to
express their opinions openly without fear of retribution or discrimination by a more-powerful majority. This is
extremely significant in countries without a culture that protects or promotes freedom of expression and where the
media are tightly controlled or censored. The Internet provides a vital online forum which, in some instances, leads
to profound impacts. Online assemblies played a pivotal role in cultivating successful revolutions in Egypt, Libya,
and Tunisia, and in the failed attempts to instigate reform in Iran and in the ongoing conflict in Syria. These
successful and failed revolution attempts were not caused by the Internet, but were certainly facilitated and perhaps
even catalyzed by it.
Consequently, the Internet’s freedom and anonymity, which are cherished and espoused in many democratic
countries, are often considered anathemas in societies where social beliefs and political realities are circumscribed
by undemocratic or theocratic regimes. Leaders who view exposure to outside opinions as threats to their cultural
1

HR 3162. USA PATRIOT Act: Uniting and strengthening America by providing appropriate tools required to intercept and obstruct terrorism
Freedom on the Internet has several connotations including privacy, the right to assemble, anonymity, and freedom of speech. My main focus in
this paper is on anonymity.
2
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and religious traditions have found creative ways to limit Internet access to preserve vested interests. Nations that
attempt to restrict freedom of speech on the Internet rely on legislation, technical means (Internet filtering, account
disablement), and coercion. Even open, democratic governments elect to engage in some form of Internet
censorship to protect national interests and prevent crime. Anonymity is also important because it enables users to
discuss personal problems and seek help anonymously from the Internet community at large in societies that can be
conservative and judgmental. These communities include groups for people of different sexual orientation,
workplace discrimination advice, medial issue discussion, and debates on race and minority issues.

Downside of Anonymity
While anonymity can be beneficial in protecting personal freedom, it may also camouflage criminal behavior. Money
laundering, drug trafficking, terrorism, hacking, fraud, child pornography, hate crimes, and bullying are all
perpetrated through and facilitated by the Internet (Armstrong & Forde, 2003). The Internet allows terrorists to share
their ideology with a wider population than ever before and to recruit individuals bent on revenge and martyrdom.
The ability to recruit local volunteers in New York, London, or Paris rather than transporting supporters from abroad
can be a significant tactical advantage. Home-grown terrorists have committed attacks in Egypt, India, Indonesia,
Pakistan, Russia, Spain, the UK, and the US. The Internet allows terrorists to create distributed, layered, and
resilient organizations and to exercise considerable influence on the flow of information, public opinion, and politics
across the globe.

Balance Between Anonymity and Security
Terrorist attacks in New York, London, and Madrid all led to public outrage and demands for greater security. Each
country differed, however, in terms of how it chose to balance these demands with the protection of personal
freedom. The USA-PATRIOT Act3 was enacted several weeks after the September 11, 2001 attacks and permitted
law enforcement agencies unprecedented access to U.S. citizens’ phones, emails, medical records, financial
records, and other types of information; the Patriot Act also broadened the discretion of law enforcement and
immigration authorities to detain and deport immigrants suspected of terrorism-related activities. This and related
legislation gave authorities the right to conduct warrantless surveillance. Various countries also adopted international
legislation that supports information sharing among themselves and defense activities against terrorist acts (e.g.,
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1368 4) in the wake of September 11th, 2001. While there have not been
any large-scale attacks on American soil since that time, there are many who would argue that the U.S. Government
overreacted. Many of the activities permitted by the USA-PATRIOT Act were meant to be phased out in 2005, but
were instead reauthorized; power granted to law enforcement officials to hunt down terrorists has, in some cases,
been misused for political purposes, personal vendettas, and human rights violations. We are faced with the task of
trying to protect privacy and personal freedom on the Internet while ensuring that law enforcement and intelligence
officials obtain the information needed to track down criminals and terrorists.
Even at a personal level, the concept of privacy can vary significantly across individuals. Breaches of sensitive
personal information can result in embarrassment and discrimination; however, an ever larger number of individuals
freely choose to disclose personal information on social networking sites such as Facebook (Albrechtslund, 2008).
Privacy is thus an extremely subjective concept. Acquisti and Grossklags (2007), moreover, argue that we worry
about insignificant invasions of privacy while overlooking atrocious ones. Protecting the Internet from cybercrime,
terrorism, and other acts of sabotage is a multi-faceted problem with political, legal, technical, and social
ramifications. Despite hyperbole surrounding efforts to reduce Internet abuses, it is not entirely clear what is at
stake. What is the price of freedom? What are we willing to sacrifice for the sake of freedom? Outside of politics,
these questions are not often asked directly, but are implicit in the security vs. freedom debate. Internet-facilitated
political changes have been remarkable, but also give us pause. To what extent may the Internet be used to foster
discontent and inflame tensions between Israelis and Palestinians or Iraqi Sunnis and Kurds? How may it be used to
mobilize Chinese and Japanese citizens to go to war over a small group of disputed islands?

Impact of Anonymity in Business Transactions
Since its inception, the Internet has evolved from serving merely as an information repository to become a vibrant
market and social-gathering place. While the Internet’s role has changed and expanded, its basic structure has not.
Efforts to integrate new roles into the same old model have not been completely successful. The economic Internet
evolved spontaneously and the problems were only realized once commerce was already intricately embedded in its
functioning. As we embark on an epic endeavor to recreate the electric grid across the world, using Internet
technologies warrants a moment of pause to rethink the technology’ basic paradigm. As we struggle to find the right
3
4

http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=107_cong_public_laws&docid=f:publ056.107
http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=S/RES/1368%20(2001)&Lang=E&Area=UNDOC
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balance on the Internet between anonymity and security, we need to understand that it is not only a social medium,
but also an engine that powers the world economy. The Internet has integrated international trade by providing the
infrastructure to link goods, services, and resources across the world. As critical as this infrastructure is, it has been
created piecemeal and is both unsecure and fragile. We continue to modify the current Internet to accommodate
fast-changing needs, which adds burden to an already fragile system. I define the challenge faced in
accommodating the competing objectives of freedom and security on the Internet in the subsequent subsection.

The Challenge
We need a resilient Internet that can accommodate new innovations while safeguarding fundamental values of
freedom of speech and anonymity. We also need the same Internet to facilitate electronic commerce and support
critical infrastructure. The balance between anonymity (that provides personal freedom) and its antithesis,
traceability (that provides the ability to track and trace undesired activities), is shrouded in ambiguity that is not easy
to resolve. If we are unable to reach a meaningful solution to this problem, the Internet in its current incarnation
faces an existential threat wherein we will end up with multiple Internets where each Internet would be designed to
have a different balance between privacy and traceability based on the specific role of the Internet. While this may
solve the security vs. privacy dilemma for specific applications, it will create logistics challenges and seriously impact
net neutrality tenets. Security and anonymity differ in importance based on the application in question: business
applications require security and privacy, social networking applications require privacy and anonymity, and critical
infrastructure communications require traceability to identify faults and other criminal activity. The first challenge is to
be able to achieve both these objectives without seriously compromising on either.
I attempt to understand the business needs both from the previous evolution and from the potential for future
innovation as I discuss this challenge. I start by using electronic commerce as a template (a situation where
scientists and engineers have struggled to cobble together a system for consummating secure transactions in an
insecure environment) and juxtapose that to the problem we face in the smart grid today. Privacy, in the context of
electronic commerce, relates to ensuring that personal, private, or sensitive information is secured appropriately. It
has parallels in the smart grid. Just like electricity usage data can reveal user behavior, purchases made through the
Internet can reveal lifestyle choices. The ability to keep secure financial transactions has enabled businesses to
move from brick-and-mortar stores to the digital marketplace. However, significant privacy breaches, such as those
affecting AOL in 2006 and Sony’s PlayStation® Network in 2011 and its film division in 2014, diminish trust in
Internet transactions, and can lead to substantial negative impact on corporate profits (Goel & Shawky, 2009). The
cost of security breaches in smart grid could be much more damaging than just financial losses. The second
challenge is to recognize the current flaws of the Internet and fix them at a fundamental level rather than relying on a
patchwork of short-term fixes done piecemeal. We not only need to design the smart grid to overcome existing flaws
but to project into the future and design it in anticipation of future needs.

IV. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS TO THE CHALLANGE
The communication infrastructure for the smart grid is being designed on the principles of the existing Internet, which
has demonstrated security weaknesses. Basing the smart grid on the existing Internet model while postponing
dealing with the security challenge is fraught with risk. It requires a priori reevaluation of the design and function of
the Internet, starting from its genesis to its anticipated evolution. The smart grid meters will connect to servers to
supply data on electricity usage, pricing, and grid operational characteristics without human intervention. The
cardinal principle of anonymity needs to be questioned in context of the smart grid. Does a conversation between
machines require anonymity? Meanwhile, traceability, the antithesis of anonymity, would not only help track hackers,
but also dissuade users from committing fraud. Since traceability is already a feature of the existing power grid
insofar as usage can be linked to specific households, why should it be any different when it is enabled through the
Internet. We need to have a public debate on adding traceability into the Internet that is switched on only for
industrial applications.
The Internet has a complex layered architecture, which results in vulnerabilities that are exploited for security
breaches. For instance, the Internet’s design is based on an addressing system that allocates an address to each
node in the network. On top of the addressing system is the Doman Name System (DNS), which is a hierarchical
distributed system for naming resources on the Internet and mapping them to addresses. The DNS translates textbased names (i.e., URLs) to numerical IP-addresses. A pointer from one URL can change from one IP-address to
another transparently by simply updating DNS registries. The mnemonic, easy-to-remember names and the ability to
change IP addresses is important in the current Internet for ease of use. However, DNS presents major
vulnerabilities that have been exploited by multiple information security threats (e.g., cache poisoning, denial-ofservice, flooding, etc.). For the smart grid network in which machines (smart meters, sensors, computers, etc.) are
talking to each other rather than humans, do we really need a DNS? Do we really need to have separate MAC and
IP-addressing schemes? Perhaps we can collapse the OSI / Internet stack into fewer layers.
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The current Internet incorporates encryption on a piecemeal basis for different applications. End-to-end encryption
could be instituted such that the vulnerabilities are only at the source and destination rather than through the entire
channel. Should encryption be the default standard pervasive across the entire smart grid since all information
needs to be secure? People fear that not only hackers and criminals will misuse information, but also that
government, law enforcement, and utility companies will, too. These entities may have a legal right to access data.
but we have to ensure through policies and regulations that there are strict control on how such data can be used,
that there are proper legal underpinnings for government agencies, and that consumers’ consent is obtained. There
is already concern that foreign governments are clandestinely probing other countries’ critical infrastructure to
identify vulnerabilities to exploit. Often, such surveillance is done through spoofed identity and proxy entities. Can we
design the smart grid network that minimizes if not eliminates the chances of spoofing? Given the vital importance of
the power grid to any nation’s security, it is essential that protocols used to maintain stability and security be
incorporated into the smart grid’s design from the ground up, rather than as an afterthought. A separate Internet,
devoted solely to managing the electricity supply, will still have vulnerabilities as will be discovered during
operations, but should be relatively more secure if the lessons learned from the Internet are used to guide its
construction.
We not only have to design the smart grid based on current needs, but also based on possible future requirements.
The present-day electric grid is power plant-centric; a majority of electricity is generated by a few large power plants
that supply the grid. One of the smart grid’s objectives is to facilitate energy generation; it is clear that, due to
logistics issues, the current design has to change to obtain sufficient energy through alternate energy sources. We
need to rely on the potential of millions of users with micro-generation capability (e.g., solar, wind) in individual
households. It is not inconceivable that the power grid would become a market-driven open system that allows users
to actively participate in controlling their usage. Thus, in the future, power may flow peer-to-peer rather than only
from the utility to the consumer. This will create an energy web driven by market forces that allows users to auction
and bid for electricity.
The smart grid will be dominated by machine-to-machine communication that will require traceability, not anonymity.
We will need complete traceability not only to minimize chances of market fraud but also to dissuade perpetrators of
critical infrastructure intrusions from launching attacks. International treaties to reduce chances of cyber warfare are
currently stymied because of lack of attribution—again a consequence of anonymity. No matter how we look at it,
anonymity is an untenable concept for the new smart grid, and its architecture needs to reflect this for a safer and
more-secure grid. There are efforts to tackle security and privacy issues by the international bodies as I discuss
below, but much work needs to be done that may lead to radical changes to the Internet. To reduce the probability of
detailed metering data from households revealing consumers’ lifestyles and behavior, new approaches need to be
developed such as temporal data aggregation for billing purposes and spatial data aggregation for forecasting or
adding noise to data to prevent it from revealing personal user information (Khurana, Hadley, Ning, & Frincke, 2010;
Efthymiou & Kalogridis, 2010).
Not only do we need to protect consumers through technical means, but we need to follow this up with legal means.
There has been a concerted effort across the United States and the European Union to develop standards and
guidelines to protect consumer data. I discuss some relevant standards and legislations in the next subsection.

Laws and Standards Relevant to Smart Grid Privacy and Security
The smart grid uses fine-grained usage data for operational needs such as load forecasting, demand response, and
load balancing, and smart meters form the first point in the collection and transmission of smart meter data. This
data allows utility companies to gain visibility into the grid for better monitoring and control and, at the same time,
inform users about their own usage patterns for making smart energy choices. This information is very potent and
can reveal lifestyle choices and behaviors of users that can be exploited for several purposes including
discrimination, marketing, and litigation. For instance, electricity usage data can be used to detect marijuana growing
operations in homes quite reliably, and police routinely issue subpoenas for obtaining electricity usage records of
suspected growers from utility companies. The regulators’ goal is to ensure that the data are adequately protected
from interested entities such as hackers, rogue businesses, intelligence organizations, and law enforcement.
Given the wireless transmission of data from smart meters, law enforcement will be able to just tap into the wireless
network and obtain the data without requiring legal authorization. Whether or not users are protected from law
enforcement to tap into smart meters without the need for subpoenas is unclear. The fourth amendment to the
constitution of the United States guarantees the right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures (U.S. Const. am. 4). The fourth amendment specifically bars
search and seizure without probable cause and legal authorization. Based on the fourth amendment law,
enforcement should not be able to tap into the smart meter to obtain metering data for an individual; however, this
has not been tested in courts for smart meters, which creates ambiguity. There has been a public debate on whether
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gathering such data is a violation of the fourth amendment of the constitution. For instance, there is a recent court
case regarding Apple’s Touch ID feature (i.e., one can use their fingerprint as a passcode on newer models of the
iPhone and iPad). Law enforcement is not legally permitted to ask the user to disclose their passcode to unlock their
phone since it violates the fifth amendment; however, they can ask the user to use their finger print to unlock the
device, which ostensibly does not violate the fifth amendment. Clear guidelines for using smart data by law
enforcement need to be established to protect smart meter adopters from such ambiguities.
The Electronic Communication Privacy Act (ECPA) acts against interception of electronic communication and
protects citizens from government surveillance; however, it does allow government to conduct surveillance on
private communication between two parties if one of the parties provides consent to such surveillance. The
transmission of smart meter usage data from consumer to utility company falls under the preview of ECPA, which
implies that a utility company’s consent would be sufficient to launch government surveillance. This is an obvious
intrusion into households and raises concerns about collusion between utility companies and government and needs
public debate. Similarly, the Stored Communications Act (SCA) would protect users from illegal access to stored
metering data. It limits third party organizations from collecting personal data to disclose data to other parties. The
data may be stored in database servers of the utility company or on the smart meters themselves, which would fall
under the preview of this legislation. The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act prohibits unauthorized access of
computerized information used in interstate commerce, which would cover smart meter data because it is used for
commerce. These statutes, however, will permit law enforcement access to smart meter data for investigative
purposes based on just cause and with legal authorization. We need to ensure the same protections for smart meter
data. A further debate is whether smart meter data are more intrusive that would require additional protection.
Consumers expect utility companies and third-party smart grid providers to follow standard privacy and information
security practices to protect user privacy; however, the concern is that some of the parties may not be completely
trustworthy. Worse still, the utility companies may sell consumer electricity usage data to third parties for financial
gain. There are provisions for telephone data that can be used as a starting point for defining similar provisions for
smart grid data. Privacy experts also need to develop privacy preserving schemes in data sharing across multiple
organizations, which may include aggregating temporal and spatial data aggregation, anonymization of metering
data, data obfuscation, and cryptographic protocols.
Several standards and guidelines are emerging to address the issues of smart grid privacy both in the United States
and the European Union. NIST (2013) classifies smart grid data into two categories: type I and type II. Type I
information did not exist before and is specific to the smart grid. Type II information existed before and is also
available from the smart grid. They contend that type II information will most likely be covered by existing privacy
legislation in other fields; however, for Type I (such as using fingerprints as a passcode for iPhones or iPads)
information, new safeguards are needed. NIST makes several recommendations that include: assessing privacy
prior to adoption of smart meters, establishing privacy policies and procedures inspired by Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) principles, developing privacy-use cases, educating the public
about privacy risk, and constraining data collection based on actual need. The Department of Energy has released
its own set of voluntary privacy recommendations for smart grid owners, operators, and third parties (DOE, 2012).
The recommendations cover several issues that include measures that utility companies should take to inform
consumers about their privacy rights, justification for data collection (i.e., what data are being collected, how it is
being collected, why it is being collected, and how it will be used), rules for data sharing, consumer consent
(including ability to opt-in and opt-out), and consumer access to their own data.
The European Commission is currently reviewing the European Union’s legal framework for the protection of
personal data to not only modernize the existing framework but also to meet the challenges that globalization and
the evolution of technology pose. The commission wants to strengthen individual rights without attenuating the free
flow of information and provide clarity and coherence to the rules such that they can be applied consistently. The
commission has provided specific guidance to member states on protecting smart meter data through Directive
95/46/EC. In accordance with the directive, the commission has developed a data-protection template for protecting
individuals’ personal data that will assess the risks posed to the information. They recommend that the network
operators and utility companies that manage the smart meters should adopt a risk-based approach and put technical
and organizational measures in place to protect the data. A risk-based approach is a good start; however, it lacks
the detail and comprehensiveness that is necessary for ensuring compliance with consistency. First, it does not
adequately distinguish between threats and vulnerabilities and, second, it does not relate specific controls to
different threats, but rather provides a catalog of threats and controls without any specific mapping. It also does not
have a way of prioritizing threats by their relative impact. There is also much work to be done in identifying all the
risks, let alone creating guidelines and treaties.
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V. CONCLUSION
This discussion of the smart grid highlights the fact that, as the Internet has evolved, so has our understanding of the
fundamental assumptions on which it is based. The different applications on the current Internet have varying
fundamental requirements, and it may be time to contemplate the creation of multiple Internets with different sets of
rules and assumptions. In order to achieve greater efficiency and reliability in the electricity grid and allow a bidirectional flow of power, our power infrastructure will be transformed by superposing a layer for communication
infrastructure on the electric grid. This communication infrastructure will not only improve efficiency and provide
network resilience but, can be leveraged to create an energy Internet where consumers directly buy and sell power
to other users in the network. It is easy to replicate the protocols of the current Internet to create the smart grid
network. The smart grid does not, however, have to be constructed on the same basis as the current Internet. It can
operate with a different set of standards than those used to regulate electronic commerce and social networking.
Rethinking the infrastructure design and basic assumptions that govern various applications would be a logical next
step. If we are able to disentangle the fundamental requirements of these separate, potential Internets, we might
even be able to construct systems that ensure greater security, but do not demand sacrifice of freedoms. The
security vs. anonymity debate has, in the past, been a domestic issue to the United States, but it now has
international connotations. Different countries have various policies on Internet policing that derive from specific
laws, customs, and norms. The fact that the Internet transcends borders implies that conflicts affected by it cannot
easily be resolved by laws drafted by individual nations. We cannot afford to have different rules for the Internet for
different countries in order to able to support global integration in areas such as energy. As we contemplate the
creation of multiple Internets and attempt to strike a balance between anonymity and security, we need to take
differing perceptions of security and anonymity contextualized in social and political manifestations of society and
streamline the process of building international consensus.
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